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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
REMINGTON RAND, INC.,
a corporation,
Appellant and Plaintiff,
vs.
THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S.
MACHADO, fdba A-1 Typewriter Company,
Defendants,
vs.

No. 8598

DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a cor·
poration,
Respondents and Garnishee Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants have substantially stated the Facts of the Case
in their brief on appeal. But to further clarify respondents'
argument a few additional facts are inserted to supplement
those previously stated by appellants.
This matter was previous! y before this court under the
same title in Case No. 83 79, and the decision which was handed
down is found at 293 Pac. 2d 416 (R. 162).
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Shortly subsequent to the time that the lower court granted
Summary Judgment to respondents, appellant made a Motion
to Amend Judgment (R. 179). Thereafter, pursuant to Stipulation of respondents, (R. 182), the Second Amended Judgment was signed and entered by the court, which contained the
following provisions significant to this appeal (R. 183-184):
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant thereto,
any and all demands and claims of Plaintiff against
Garnishee Defendants based upon or arising out of
any alleged claimed indebtedness of Garnishee Defendants to Thurman E. O'Neil, Defendant in the
above entitled action, prior to the date of Garnishee
Defendants' Answers to Garnishments made by Garnishee Defendants on the 30th day of July, 1956, shall
not be further maintained against Garnishee Defendants by way of garnishment proceedings.
FURTHER ORDERED, that the Motion of Plaintiff
for leave to file an Amended Reply to the Answer of
said Garnishees to the Writ of Garnishment issued
March 17, 1955, be and the same is hereby denied;
FURTHER ORDERED, that the following personal
property is ad judged to be the property of Defendant
Thurman E. O'Neil:
3 Cole Steel Cabinets ( 1 damaged)
1 Air Compressor (Par M15 A17994)
3 Parts cabinets with parts
1 Supreme Power Cleaner
1 Remington Cash Register 41882 A 339
1 National Cash Register 2924392 1722E
1 Used National Cash Register, Service Station
Model 1082 with grey, slick finish (only service
station model on premises)
The provision of the judgment relating to the aforesaid
properties is not found in the original Summary Judgment
4
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(R. 177-178), but was inserted in the Second Amended Judgment prepared by appellant. It should also be noted at this
point that all of the said properties were originally seized
by Remington Rand, Inc. (appellant herein) prior to the
former appeal in this matter and that they have retained
possession and control of the properties at all times since and
up to the present time, and that it was not until on or about
Nov. 13, 1956, that the other tangible personal properties of
these respondents were returned to them (some 9 months after
the decision in the prior appeal.) Appellant has never returned
the money seized from respondents' bank accounts. (See R.
188, 189, 190, 191).

The instructions which appellant furnished to the Sheriff
of Salt Lake County (R. 188-189) excepted the foregoing
personal properties from being delivered to respondents. These
properties were the same items to which at all times during
proceedings in the cause respondents disclaimed any ownership.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED
GARNISHEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO SERVE ITS REPLY
WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY STATUTE.
II. BY ACCEPTING THE RELIEF AND RETAINING
THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED BY RULE 64 D(i), APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM TAKING FURTHER
ACTION.

5
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ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED
GARNISHEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO SERVE ITS REPLY
WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY STATUTE.
\

Although the prior decision in this case was handed down
on February 15, 1956 (R. 162), it was not until July 25, 1956
(R. 160) that appellant re-served garnishments identical in
scope and time to the ones previously served, thereby seeking
to re-trace steps taken by it over a year previously. In its Motion
for Summary Judgment before the lower ~ourt, garnishees
successfully argued that the prior Supreme Court Decision and
the effect of Rule 64 D (h) and ( i) had concluded the matter
insofar as further proceedings by way of garnishments were
concerned.
Rule 64 D(g), URCP, provides that after the garnishee
files a verified answer to the plaintiff's interrogatories(( . . . the garnishee shall be relieved from further
liability in the proceedings unless his answer shall be
successfully controverted as hereinafter provided."
In order to successfully controvert the answers Rule 64
D{h), URCP, states:
the plaintiff may, within 10 days after the expiration of the time allowed for the filing of such
answer, serve upon the garnishee and file a reply to
the whole or any part thereof, ... ''
H

•••

Rule 64 D ( i) then provides that if the plaintiff fails to
reply to the answer of the garnishee, he shall be deemed to
6
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have accepted it as correct, and judgment may be entered thereon.
Rule 5 (a) , URCP, provides that every order required by
its terms to be served and every paper requiring service shall
be served upon each of the parties affected thereby. By using
the word nshall" the legislature has made the failure to serve
when required a jurisdictional defect.
As this Court held in the prior action:
ccThe very purpose of the rule requiring service of an
(Answer to Reply of Garnishee' which can set forth
new matter charging a garnishee with liability is to
avoid such a situation as occurred in the instant case."
In garnishment proceedings more so than in almost any
other proceeding the rights of the parties thereto are concluded
by the parties themselves through their interchange of interrogatories and answers. By not receiving a reply to his answers
a garnishee has every right to expect that in accordance with
Rule 64 D(i), URCP, the judgment entered upon the basis
of his answers will conclude the matter.
Where the statute or rule requires, as does Rule 64 D (h),
that the answers to the interrogatories contained in the garnishment be contested within a specified time, it is incumbent
upon the plaintiff to make a proper issue within the time allowed (Phelps v. Schmuck-Kansas, 1940, 100 Pac. 2d 67).
In this case the answers were not properly contested within the
specified time. Thus, in the Phelps case where another summons was issued one year after a similar summons the garnishee was upheld in its defense that it had filed its answer

7
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to the previous summons and that within 20 days thereafter
plaintiff did not serve upon the garnishee a notice in writing
that plaintiff elected to take issue on the answer, and that as
provided by the statute the answer became conclusive of the
truth of the facts stated and that thereafter plaintiff was barred
and had no further right to proceed against the garnishee.
The court in the Phelps case further held that(( ... the plaintiff, having instituted proceedings in
garnishment by filing her affidavit thereof on June 25,
193 7, is not in a position to question the sufficiency
of her own pleading and does not do so. The affidavit
then filed proper!y started a proceeding to determine
the liability of the garnishee."
See also Septer v. Boyles, 147 Kan. 356, 76 P. 2nd 771. In
Roman vs. Montgomery Iron Works et al., (Alabama 1908),
47 So. 136, 19 L.R.A. (NS) 604, the court held:
(( . . . the failure of the creditor to contest the answer
and who in the meantime permits the court to proceed
to judgment is unlike the mere dismissal of the garnishment, but is in effect an admission of the recitals
of the answer. And a judgment rendered thereon for
the plaintiff, if the answer admitted indebtedness,
would be conclusive between the immediate parties,
and one rendered for the garnishee, when the answer
denied indebtedness, would also be conclusive as between the creditor and the garnishee."
And from 5 Am. Jur., Attachment & Garnishment, Sec.
763, p. 61:
((If issue is not taken on the statements of the garnishee, such statements n1ust be taken as admitted, and
the ans\ver of the garnishee is then the sole test of his
indebtedness or liability."
8
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Appellant has cited two cases in support of its position that
a judgment such as was handed down in the previous garnishment proceeding is not a judgment on the merits and therefore
not res judicata. The first case so cited, Lyon v. Pittsburgh Allegheny and Manchester T. Co., (Penn. 1933), 169 A. 229,
can be distinguished on two grounds: ( 1) That there was no
statute similar to the Utah garnishment rules requiring service
of a reply to the garnishee's answer in force in Pennsylvania
at the time of that case, and ( 2) the court there pointed out
that the garnishees could not on their own showing prevent
a summary judgment, this being conclusive proof in that case
on the important question of whether the second writ was
vexatious in nature. However, in the case at bar the garnishee
has obtained not only a summary judgment but also a prior
ruling of this court, thereby making it most evident that it is
continuously being harassed by vexatious tactics.
The second case cited by appellant is Marsh} Jr. v·. Phillips}
Jr. and CoeJ 77 Georgia 436, and can be distinguished from
the instant action on two grounds: ( 1) There was no statute
similar to the Utah garnishment rules in force in Georgia in
1886, and ( 2) the court in that case pointed out that where
the question is can a garnishment be served again on the same
garnishee after the judgment discharged him, the discharge
is a judgment for him on the merits and cannot be tried
again and re-opened except as all other judgments may be,
that is, for fraud in procuring it or other legal reason.
In the very recent decision of Glenn v. Ferrell et al. (Nov.
1956), 304 Pac. 2d 380, at pages 382 and 383, Justice Crockett
spoke for the Utah Supreme Court in a unanimous decision:

9
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((Although this court has indicated that statutes
relating to attachment and garnishment should be liberally construed to effect their purpose, it has also recognized that where there is a defect which is jurisdictional in nature, it must not be disregarded.
(CWe agree with the holding of the trial court that
the failure to serve the corporation in accordance with
the requirements of Rule 64C renders the attachment
defective. Accordingly, the subsequent proceedings and
judgment were properly set aside."
In conclusion it might be said that
in a proper case
where the first garnishment is premature, Mutual Bldg. & Loan
Assn. of Long Beach v. Corum, 16 Cal. App. 2nd 212, 60 Pac.
2nd 316), or where the answer to the first summons shows
plaintiff's claim exceeds garnishee's indebtedness (Johnson v.
Atlanta Furniture Co., 47 Ga. App. 124, 169 S. E. 767), and
under a permissive statute, successive writs of garnishment
may be issued from time to time during the pendency of the
proceedings." 38 C. J. S. (Garnishment 151).
(t

•

•

•

The case at bar is neither a proper case for, nor is there
a Utah statute authorizing and permitting, successive writs of
garnishment!
II. BY ACCEPTING THE RELIEF AND RETAINING
THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED BY RULE 64 D(i), APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM TAKING FURTHER
ACTION.
As set forth in the preceding Statement of Facts, appellant has for nearly two years retained the personal properties
disclaitned by these respondents in their original garnishment
answers. And to fortify its hold on those properties appellant

10
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secured the Second Amended Judgment (R. 183-184) specifically setting those properties apart as belonging to O'Neil.
Appellant then express! y excepted those properties from being
delivered to respondents in its instructions to the Sheriff of
Salt Lake County (R. 188-189).
Although appellant may contend otherwise by some
method of attenuated reasoning, by retaining dominion over
the properties disclaimed by respondents it has for all practical
purposes fully accepted the relief granted under Rule 64 D (i)
and in the decision of the court in its Second Amended Judgment.
By accepting and retaining the properties appellant's attempt to again pursue the procedure of Rule 64 D(h) is wholly
inconsistent with its claim that it has been denied its garnishment rights by being refused permission to re-open garnishment proceedings involving the same identical time and
matters previously involved in a matter where it failed to serve
its Reply within the permitted time.
It should be noted that garnishment proceedings are provisional and special in nature and should be strictly followed.
Furthermore, appellant has not once suggested that it does
not have other legal remedies to pursue if these respondents
actually owe any amounts to O'Neil, and the lower court's
decision (R. 184) specifically barred1 further garnishment
proceedings only. But the remedy by garnishment proceedings
has been lost through its own errors and omissions which have
prevented the lower court from being in a position to acquire
jurisdiction.

11
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CONCLUSION
What appellant would have this court do is to nullify
the main portions of the very same Second Amended Judgment
whereby it has sought to retain to itself all of its beneficial
provisions. To by-pass and disregard the 10-day requirement
of service set forth in Rule 64 D (h) would make the jurisdictional requirement therein a mockery and meaningless.
Litigation should be concluded in respect of special proceedings more so than in other cases. If in this state garnishments
can be re-commenced merely because the moving party. failed
to serve its reply within the allowable 10-day period, then we
can expect the courts and litigants to be perpetually harassed
by the very manner of doings which have plagued these respondents for two years.
4 Am. Jur., Attachment & Garnishment, Sec. 42, p. 575,
has well summarized respondents' contentions:
"A rule, generally observed, is that the authority of
the court to proceed in attachment or garnishment is
to be limited strictly, like the courts of special or limited
jurisdiction, and that it will not enjoy any presumption
in its favor. This rule is a corollary of the rule that attachment and garnishment statutes are to be construed
strictly against the attaching or garnishing creditor
because they are statutory remedies in derogation of the
common law." (Italics added.)
The decision of the Third Judicial District Court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER and JOSEPH Y. LARSEN, JR.
By: Glen E. Fuller
Attorneys for Respondents
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